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Do recent events such as the controversies over Sky City, 
election funding, ministerial expenses and so on raise 
questions about the standards of behaviour demanded of 
New Zealand’s public figures? If so, are there lessons that 
can be drawn from elsewhere about how to monitor and 
anticipate risks to public integrity? Perhaps one instructional 
example can be found in the United Kingdom’s Committee 
for Standards in Public Life (CSPL).
In January 2013 the CSPL published 
Standards Matter: a review of best practice 
in promoting good behaviour in public 
life, which looked at the difference the 
CSPL had made to nearly 20 years of 
British public life. Without question it 
can point to a number of substantial 
achievements. Its recommendations have 
led to new integrity regimes for ministers 
and MPs, lords and civil servants. It 
helped to create an entirely new standards 
framework for local government. The 
CSPL was instrumental in establishing 
the Office for the Commissioner for 
Public Appointments, which overseas 
recruitment to arm’s-length organisations 
and non-government departmental 
bodies. Perhaps most impressively, the 
CSPL can rightly lay claim to having 
crafted the most substantial reforms of 
the electoral system and political party 
funding in living memory.
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Between 2012 and 2013, however, the 
CSPL was also subject to a review by the 
Public Administration Select Committee, 
in which several commentators suggested 
that perhaps its time had come. Some 
suggested that there was simply not 
enough work for it to do, and while it 
is true to suggest that its output may 
have dropped somewhat in recent years, 
such an opinion seems unusual when 
set against the almost continual political 
scandals of recent years: party funding; 
lobbying; and, perhaps most famously, the 
MPs’ expenses scandal. Others suggested 
that a new system be established, in 
which ‘a college of regulators’ could 
oversee enquiries in a more systematic 
and synthesised way (Riddell, 2013).
This article will briefly offer an 
overview of the CSPL, the reason it was 
created and the work it has achieved. It 
will then look at some recent criticisms, 
and will draw on the latest review to 
look at its possible future role. It will 
conclude by asking whether or not such 
a body would be useful to public life in 
New Zealand, and if so how it could be 
established.
Foundations and first steps
The CSPL is an advisory non-
departmental public body (NDPB) 
sponsored by the Cabinet Office. It 
has ten members: one member each is 
nominated by the Conservative, Labour 
and Liberal-Democrat parties; the 
remaining seven members (including 
the chair) are independent. The CSPL 
was originally chaired by Lord Nolan, 
and was subsequently led by Lord Neill, 
Sir Nigel Wicks, Sir Alistair Graham and 
(until earlier this year) Sir Christopher 
Kelly. It was established in 1994 by 
Prime Minister John Major as a direct 
response to charges of corruption and 
sleaze against his own government. By 
the mid-1990s the UK Conservative 
government was beset by scandals and 
allegations of corruption, particularly 
regarding the sex lives of ministers and 
MPs, and the pursuit of private interests 
through lobbying, culminating in the 
‘cash for questions’ scandal. Yet even in 
the years prior to this there had been an 
increased concern among politicians and 
political commentators that standards of 
conduct were not what they should be. 
The parliamentary Select Committee on 
Standards and Privileges, for example, 
produced three separate reports in 1991 
and 1992 relating to a whole host of issues: 
MP conflicts of interest; select committee 
membership; parliamentary lobbying; 
and the registration and declaration of 
MPs’ financial interests. Tellingly, some of 
these issues remain as pertinent as ever. 
The select committee reports were 
regarded as of the utmost importance 
and were produced in order to deflect 
behaviour away from possibly criminal 
activities:
the intervention of the criminal law, 
the police, the law and the courts 
of law in matters so intimately 
related to the proceedings of the 
House would be a serious and in our 
view regrettable development, and 
would have profound constitutional 
implications. (Doig, 1996) 
These concerns coincided, of 
course, with Major’s doomed call for 
a return to family values, known as the 
‘Back to Basics’ campaign, launched 
to considerable fanfare in October 
1993. Almost immediately a number of 
(predominantly Conservative) MPs and 
junior ministers were exposed in a variety 
of sexual exploits, so that the campaign 
might perhaps more appropriately have 
been labelled Basic Instincts. 
Although such hijinks caught the 
public imagination, of much greater 
significance was the simultaneous 
emergence of a number of high-level 
financial scandals. The parliamentary 
private secretaries Graham Riddick and 
David Tredinnick were suspended in 
1994 following allegations that they had 
been prepared to accept £1,000 to table 
parliamentary questions. A few months 
later, in October 1994, Neil Hamilton 
(minister for corporate affairs) and Tim 
Smith (minister for Northern Ireland) 
were alleged to have received payments 
and other benefits in connection with 
Mohamed Al-Fayed, the owner of 
Harrods, directly and through a lobby 
firm led by Ian Greer. An internal inquiry 
was undertaken by the cabinet secretary, 
during which both Greer and Hamilton 
issued writs. While Hamilton denied the 
allegations, Smith agreed that he had 
accepted money and resigned. Hamilton 
was forced to resign later the same day 
by the prime minister, who announced 
within days the establishment of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
to be chaired by Lord Nolan.
The CSPL’s original terms of reference 
were: 
to examine current concerns about 
standards of conduct of all holders of 
public office, including arrangements 
relating to financial and commercial 
activities, and to make any 
recommendations as to any changes 
in present arrangements which might 
be required to ensure the highest 
standards of propriety in public life. 
(CSPL, 1995, p.2) 
For the purposes of the CSPL’s terms 
of reference, ‘holders of public office’ 
referred to a number of categories, 
including ministers, civil servants and 
special advisers; members of Parliament 
and members of the European Parliament; 
members and senior officers of non-
departmental public bodies and National 
Health Service bodies; non-ministerial 
office holders; members and senior officers 
of other bodies responsible for spending 
public money; and elected members and 
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Prime Minister Tony Blair added ... 
‘to review issues in relation to the 
funding of political parties, and to make 
recommendations as to any changes in 
present arrangements’.
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senior officers of local authorities. On 
the appointment of its new chair, Lord 
Neil, in November 1997, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair added the following terms of 
reference: ‘to review issues in relation to 
the funding of political parties, and to 
make recommendations as to any changes 
in present arrangements’. It should be 
noted that, as with Major before him, 
Blair’s terms of reference were a direct 
response to the first scandal of his prime 
ministership: the alleviation of a ban on 
tobacco sponsorship for Formula One 
racing which had coincided with a £1 
million donation from Bernie Ecclestone, 
the president and chief executive officer 
of Formula One Management, to New 
Labour prior to the 1997 election.
Since its inception, then, the CSPL has 
had powers to make recommendations 
for change, but it has never had powers of 
enforcement. It is, however, free to open 
an inquiry into any area within its terms 
of reference, but this must be agreed with 
the prime minister. The extent to which 
this may place a restriction on the CSPL’s 
independence is a matter that will be 
discussed below.
The work of the CSPL
Perhaps the most famous, and lasting, 
contribution of the committee remains 
the seven principles of public life (still 
commonly referred to as the Nolan 
principles after its first chair). These 
principles are still in use throughout the 
UK and consist of: selflessness; integrity; 
objectivity; accountability; openness; 
honesty; and leadership. In 2013 the 
descriptors for these values were slightly 
altered to refresh people’s understanding 
of the principles (see Table 1).
Concern remains, however, not least 
within the committee itself, that these 
principles, though widely understood, 
have still not been properly integrated 
into many public organisations. As the 
latest CSPL report suggests: 
Ethical standards should be deeply 
embedded in governance and other 
organisational processes so that they 
become an integral part of ‘the way 
things are done around here’ and 
so that individual behaviour which 
does not meet those standards is 
challenged. (CSPL, 2013, p.8)
The committee has held 13 public 
inquiries (see Table 2), and has also 
conducted three public trust surveys, and 
provided numerous responses to other 
issues as and when they have arisen. 
 Without question, recommendations 
from the initial reports led to substantial 
reforms. From the 55 recommendations in 
the first report, for example, arose codes 
of conduct for ministers and MPs and the 
creation of the offices of Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Standards and 
Privileges and Commissioner for Public 
Appointments, and the Select Committee 
on Standards in Public Life.
In terms of ministerial rules 
and procedures, the report made 20 
recommendations which largely became 
enshrined in a new ministerial code 
of conduct. Until the code came into 
Table 1: The principles of public life 1995–2013
The 1995 principles of public life The 2013 principles of public life
Selflessness – Holders of public office 
should act solely in terms of the public 
interest. They should not do so in order 
to gain financial or other benefits for 
themselves, their family or their friends.
Selflessness – Holders of public office 
should act solely in terms of the public 
interest.
Integrity – Holders of public office should 
not place themselves under any financial 
or other obligation to outside individuals or 
organisations that might seek to influence 
them in the performance of their official 
duties.
Integrity – Holders of public office must 
avoid placing themselves under any 
obligation to people or organisations that 
might try inappropriately to influence them 
in their work. They should not act or take 
decisions in order to gain financial or other 
material benefits for themselves, their 
family, or their friends. They must declare 
and resolve any interests and relationships.
Objectivity – In carrying out public 
business, including making public 
appointments, awarding contracts, or 
recommending individuals for rewards and 
benefits, holders of public office should 
make choices on merit.
Objectivity – Holders of public office must 
act and take decisions impartially, fairly 
and on merit, using the best evidence and 
without discrimination or bias.
Accountability – Holders of public office are 
accountable for their decisions and actions 
to the public and must submit themselves 
to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their 
office.
Accountability – Holders of public office are 
accountable to the public for their decisions 
and actions and must submit themselves to 
the scrutiny necessary to ensure this.
Openness – Holders of public office should 
be as open as possible about all the 
decisions and actions that they take. They 
should give reasons for their decisions and 
restrict information only when the wider 
public interest clearly demands.
Openness – Holders of public office should 
act and take decisions in an open and 
transparent manner. Information should not 
be withheld from the public unless there 
are clear and lawful reasons for so doing.
Honesty – Holders of public office have a 
duty to declare any private interests relating 
to their public duties and to take steps to 
resolve any conflicts arising in a way that 
protects the public interest.
Honesty – Holders of public office should 
be truthful.
Leadership – Holders of public office should 
promote and support these principles by 
leadership and example.
Leadership – Holders of public office 
should exhibit these principles in their own 
behaviour. They should actively promote 
and robustly support the principles and 
be willing to challenge poor behaviour 
wherever it occurs.
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force in 1997, rules regarding ministers’ 
conduct had been developed on an ad 
hoc basis over a 40-year period. The new 
code also established rules on conflicts 
of interest, gifts and hospitality, and 
post-ministerial business appointments, 
including establishing that ministers must 
now consult the Advisory Committee 
on Business Appointments if they wish 
to take up a paid business appointment 
within two years of leaving office. All of 
these rules and regulations were revisited 
in CSPL’s sixth report, which amended 
the wording of the code to strengthen 
individual ministerial responsibility, even 
after a minister has accepted the advice of 
his or her permanent secretary.
The committee’s first report also made 
11 principal recommendations (alongside 
numerous sub-recommendations) regard-
ing the standards of conduct of members 
of Parliament, including establishing a 
code of conduct (which was adopted in 
July 1995); strengthening the registers 
of interest that were established in 1975; 
passing a resolution to prevent MPs acting 
as paid lobbyists; and, perhaps most 
significantly, setting up a new independent 
office to oversee parliamentary standards, 
the Parliamentary Commissioner.
One of the most significant of the 
CSPL’s recommendations was the creation 
of an oversight and scrutiny body for non-
departmental public bodies, the Office of 
Commissioner for Public Appointments 
(OCPA), which was formally established 
on 23 November 1995. The OCPA is 
independent of government, and is 
responsible for regulating, monitoring 
and reporting appointments of Ministers 
to public bodies. The 1995 CSPL report 
also recommended that non-departmental 
public bodies should keep a register of 
members’ interests. 
The third report, on local government, 
made 39 recommendations, almost all 
of which were included in the Local 
Government Act 2000. The report was 
conducted on the back of increased 
concern regarding local government by 
the late 1990s, after public confidence 
had been undermined by a small number 
of particularly high profile cases. A 
police investigation into Doncaster 
Metropolitan Council, for example, 
yielded 35 prosecutions in a number 
of key areas: expense/subsistence claim 
payments; tendering and contracts; 
planning (land deals and planning 
permission/bribery and corruption); and 
council partnerships with large building 
developers. The CSPL report found that 
although such cases were very severe, 
they were not widespread, and in general 
it concluded that local government 
had good standards of conduct. Its 
recommendations included the adoption 
of a statutory code of conduct (a voluntary 
code had been established by the Local 
Government Act 1974); the strengthening 
and increased transparency of local 
registers of interest; and the creation of 
local standards committees in every local 
authority, which were statutorily obliged 
to include non-elected members of the 
public on the committee. The Localism 
Act 2011, however, regrettably reversed 
almost the entire infrastructure, leading 
to an outcry within local government 
(Macaulay et al., 2012).
The CSPL’s fifth report followed on 
from Tony Blair’s expanded terms of 
reference and looked at the funding 
of political parties. As a result the 
report addressed wider issues than 
simply conduct. The report made 
100 recommendations, which led to 
the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 and the creation 
of the Electoral Commission, established 
in November 2000. The Electoral 
Commission is independent of the 
executive and any political party, and 
is accountable directly to Parliament. 
Under the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act, donations of more than 
£200 made to a political party or candidate 
can only be accepted from a ‘permissible 
donor’.1 No ceiling was placed on the 
amount that can be donated, although 
Table 2: CSPL reports 1995–2013 
Date No Title
May 1995 1 Standards in Public Life
May 1996 2 Local Public Spending Bodies
July 1997 3
Standards of Conduct of Local Government in England, 
Scotland and Wales
Nov 1997 4
Standards of Conduct in Executive NDPBs, NHS Trusts and 
Local Public Spending Bodies
Oct 1998 5 The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom
Jan 2000 6
Reinforcing Standards: a review of the first report of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life
Nov 2000 7 Standards of Conduct in the House of Lords
Nov 2002 8 Standards of Conduct in the House of Commons
Apr 2003 9
Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: ministers, 
special advisers and the permanent civil service
Jan 2005 10
Getting the Balance Right: implementing standards of conduct 
in public life
Jan 2007 11 Review of the Electoral Commission
Nov 2009 12
MPs’ Expenses and Allowances: supporting Parliament, 
safeguarding the taxpayer
Jan 2013 13
Standards Matter: a review of best practice in promoting high 
standards of behaviour in public life
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all political parties must publicly declare 
all donations of £5,000 or more accepted 
by party headquarters. Parties must also 
report any donations made to branches 
of £1,000 or more. The act effectively 
bans overseas donations, and anonymous 
donations, which used to be acceptable, 
must now be returned or placed in a 
central fund. It is a criminal offence to 
accept impermissible donations.
The seventh report looked at the House 
of Lords and made 23 recommendations, 
which led directly to the adoption of a 
House of Lords code of conduct in July 
2001, to come into effect on 31 March 
2002. The code of conduct enforces the ‘no 
paid advocacy’ rule. A member must not 
accept any financial reward for influence 
in the House of Lords; this includes 
voting on bills, voting on motions, asking 
questions (whether in the House or in a 
committee), or promotion of any other 
matter.
In many if not all sectors, therefore, the 
CSPL has proved invaluable in establishing 
an integrity infrastructure throughout 
the UK. Yet it has not, of course, put an 
end to ethical problems in public life; far 
from it. It could be reasonably argued 
that in the course of the last four years 
the UK has been hit by a succession of 
scandals that has outweighed anything 
since the days of sleaze. This situation 
begs a number of questions: why have 
such scandals continued, and in terms 
of magnitude perhaps even increased? 
And to what extent can the CSPL be held 
responsible?
More pain than gain?
The MPs’ expenses scandal, the Levenson 
inquiry, the continuing issues over a 
lobbyists’ register, numerous corruption 
allegations (both historical and recent) 
against the police, and the reluctance to 
deal with political party funding have all 
seemed to appear anew on the horizon 
since 2009. Yet the truth is that they had 
never gone away.
Mixed in with the CSPL’s early 
successes were numerous setbacks. In 
its 2003 report on non-departmental 
public bodies, for example, the Public 
Administration Select Committee found 
that 15% of central government bodies 
were not yet regulated by the OCPA. The 
select committee report also found that, 
contrary to the CSPL recommendations, 
many public bodies do not keep a 
register, and that existing registers were 
not easily available to the public. Finally, 
the parliamentary report demonstrated 
that appointments to over a hundred 
independent bodies were made directly 
by the prime minister, or at least made 
by the Queen on the prime minister’s 
recommendations, which clearly called 
the independence of such bodies into 
question.
Party funding has been repeatedly on 
the agenda, most infamously in the party 
loans scandal of 2005, in which each of the 
three major political parties had exploited 
a loophole in the Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act to allow 
anonymous donors to provide millions of 
pounds on the basis that the money was 
not a donation but a ‘commercial loan’. 
By common acknowledgement this was a 
clear breach of the spirit (if not the letter) 
of the law, and each party apologised and 
promised to pay the money back after 
publicly identifying the lenders. The 
scandal led to the arrest of a number 
of people, including Lord Levy, and 
also resulted in Blair being questioned 
several times by the Metropolitan Police 
(although never under caution or arrest). 
No criminal charges were ever brought 
against anybody in connection with the 
matter.
Conflicts of interest continued 
to dog MPs and ministers from all 
parties, stretching from the nepotism 
of Conservative Derek Conway to the 
illicit donations garnered by Labour’s 
Peter Hain. It has long been evident 
that the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Standards has not proven to be an 
easy role: there have been substantial 
clashes between highly visible MPs and 
the commissioner ever since the role was 
introduced, not least of them being the 
vituperative exchange between Labour’s 
Keith Vaz and the then commissioner 
Elizabeth Filkin.
Yet it has been the scandals since 
2009 that have really rocked the ethical 
equilibrium of the UK, and to an extent 
may have dwarfed the work of the CSPL. 
The MPs’ expenses scandal, which led to 
a number of MPs and lords being sent to 
prison, created a huge public outcry. The 
Levenson inquiry has almost certainly 
garnered more media coverage than the 
entire work of the CSPL put together. 
The recent review of the committee, 
conducted by Peter Riddell for the Public 
Administration Select Committee, took 
some of these issues into account and 
looked for possible alternatives to it, 
including its abolition and replacement 
with a variety of possible reforms. The 
report concluded that, on the whole, 
the committee remains a valuable 
institution: 
There is a continuing need for 
an ethics monitor/reviewer. The 
CSPL should remain as a non-
departmental public body – the 
other models for delivering the role 
of an ethics monitor/reviewer that I 
examined as part of this review are 
not appropriate. But a fresh start is 
needed to make the committee more 
effective and to give it greater impact. 
(Riddell, 2013)
The MPs’ expenses scandal, the 
Levenson inquiry, the continuing issues 
over a lobbyists’ register, numerous 
corruption allegations ... against the 
police, and the reluctance to deal with 
political party funding ... had never gone 
away.
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Among the recommendations the re-
view made were to enhance the indepen-
dence of the committee even further by 
strengthening its recruitment processes; 
that it become more strategic; and, per-
haps most interestingly of all, that it be-
have more proactively: ‘The Committee 
should be bolder in picking topics, look-
ing ahead to emerging problems, rather 
than reacting to scandals and allegations 
of ethical abuses which have already 
emerged’ (Riddell, 2013). Long-time ob-
servers of public life in the UK must be 
delighted to see such a view stated so 
plainly. It is hard to disagree that the CS-
PL’s most significant reforms have come 
about when it has reacted to a specific 
scandal. The CSPL’s recommendations 
have undoubtedly had a significant im-
pact on public life in terms of creating an 
ethics and integrity infrastructure, but its 
most far-reaching successes appear to 
have arisen from a melding of political 
will and public outrage, with the latter 
fuelling the former. 
The CSPL was, of course, only created 
as a direct result of the public backlash 
against sleaze; Blair’s expansion of the 
terms of reference is unlikely to have 
come about so soon had he not suffered 
the first big blow of his prime ministerial 
rein. It is interesting to note that when 
his successor, Gordon Brown, was facing 
open hostility through the expenses 
scandal he chose not to wait for the CSPL 
at all and put through the Parliamentary 
Standards Act 2009 in a matter of three 
to four weeks. In this case the CSPL was 
a full six months behind the legislation, 
and thus had already lost significant 
momentum in the debate. 
It is of little surprise, then, that recent 
criticisms of the CSPL included the 
scope of its work: as Table 2 shows, there 
has been a tendency to revise previous 
reports rather than branching out into 
new areas. Moreover, the CSPL’s output 
under the current coalition government 
has notably slowed further, and it is 
perhaps telling that this government is 
the first to significantly repeal reforms 
the committee had helped make, with 
the abolition of the local government 
standards framework under the Localism 
Act 2011 (Macaulay et al., 2012).
Where political will has been sluggish 
– such as over the move towards more 
substantial party funding reforms, which 
in July 2013 were postponed once again 
until after the 2015 elections – there has 
appeared to be little the CSPL can do 
other than note its disappointment. Yet 
perhaps this is in itself a crucial task; 
the simple existence of an independent 
body to remind both the public and 
political leaders that there is an ethos 
underpinning public service which is 
vital to its existence. More importantly, a 
more far-sighted, strategic outlook would 
undoubtedly strengthen the CSPL’s hand 
even further.
A CSPL for New Zealand?
The CSPL has not, and could not, end 
scandals in British public life. Yet it has 
made a significant difference in creating 
an ethics infrastructure, and also by 
speaking truth to power. Arguably, it has 
even been helpful that many more recent 
scandals can be framed in light of previous 
CSPL recommendations: illicit donations, 
for example, are now always discussed in 
reference to the rules of Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act and 
the Electoral Commission. These are 
significant advances which should not be 
underestimated.
Yet a more long-term view is needed. 
The reactive culture of the political class 
in the UK is somewhat dispiriting, and 
it will be extremely beneficial in terms 
of public awareness and frank debate 
to be able to allow the CSPL to pick off 
higher-hanging fruit, rather than just the 
windfall that has already dropped to the 
ground.
Whether or not such an institution 
is required in New Zealand is, of course, 
open for debate. Without question the 
scale and intensity of political scandals 
here does not compare with that in the 
UK, and New Zealand has a justifiably 
famous reputation in terms of good 
governance and anti-corruption. But this 
does not mean that New Zealand lacks 
challenges. There are currently continuing 
concerns over what appears some to be 
deal-making with Sky City, and there has 
been a rising concern over the reduction in 
the public service’s ability to provide ‘free 
and frank advice’ (Martin, 2012). Debates 
over a lobbyists’ register are ongoing. The 
occasional eruptions inevitably lead to 
uncomfortable questions about whether 
there might be complacency about 
standards in public life and a shortage 
of independent bodies to monitor and 
anticipate. 
Perhaps, also, it is propitious timing for 
considering the merits of a New Zealand 
version of the CSPL. Transparency 
International New Zealand is currently 
looking at the ‘national integrity system’ 
of the country, and there could be a good 
case to be made for the government 
to establishing a committee to look at 
strengthening the integrity of New Zealand 
using Transparency International’s 
findings as a launch pad. Of course there 
is no reason to simply try and replicate 
the CSPL model, but at the very least it 
would be beneficial to take into account 
Peter Riddell’s recommendations for a 
more forward-looking and independent 
body. Nevertheless, history shows that 
integrity and ethics do not stand still: 
the acceptable level of high standards 
of conduct at one point can doubtless 
deteriorate and corrode. 
There are currently continuing concerns 
over what appears to be some to be deal-
making with Sky City, and there has been 
a rising concern over the reduction in the 
public service’s ability to provide ‘free 
and frank advice’ ...
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If a body such as the CSPL is needed, it 
is surely in this future-proofing capacity, 
to help stimulate debate and provide 
recommendations for action on issues 
before they become too problematic: to 
frame the ethics and integrity agenda 
instead of reacting to the most significant 
scandal. In its latest report the CSPL 
clearly sets out its concerns for the future 
in the UK. Some are old (party funding, 
lobbying); others are new (concerns over 
the Localism Act). Many are broader 
and require a strategic view: the shifting 
governance arrangements and forms of 
service delivery that require ever more 
nuanced integrity management (CSPL, 
2013). If New Zealand was to open a debate 
about the merits of such an institution, 
it should not be regarded as a reaction 
to current scandals but as a means by 
which the integrity agenda can evolve 
in a constructive and positive manner. 
For New Zealand to continue to be seen 
as an international leader in this field – 
which it undoubtedly is – it may be time 
to grasp some emergent political nettles 
before their sting is felt too keenly.
1 Permissible donors include any UK individual registered 
on an electoral register; a registered party; a company; 
a trade union; a building society; a limited liability 
partnership; a friendly, industrial or provident society; and an 
unincorporated association.
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